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3.1  Introduction 
There has recently been a sea change in the philosophy of  tax policy in 
Sweden. Sodersten (1991, 16) calls the 1991 reforms “the most far-reaching 
reform of the nation’s tax system for at least 40 years.” Neutrality has replaced 
social and economic engineering and redistribution of income as the key prin- 
ciple guiding tax policy. This revolution in thought is reflected in the tax re- 
forms enacted in 1985, 1991, and 1994. However, proposals to be implemented 
during the next few years may turn out to increase asymmetries in the system 
again. 
This paper traces the incentives for investment in the Swedish economy cre- 
ated by the tax system. Since taxation of labor income is treated in other chap- 
ters of  this book, our investigation focuses on the taxation of  income from 
capital and the development of tax policy over the past twenty-five years. The 
reforms of  1991-94  are examined in detail in order to evaluate their expected 
effect on resource allocation and the distribution of welfare. The aim is to shed 
some light on Swedish tax policy and its development. 
The theory of optimal taxation  seldom gives concrete direction to policy 
makers. However, one rule of thumb, which is both intuitively appealing and 
relatively easy to implement, states that taxes should be neutral, unless it is 
proved that distortive taxes are desirable. Neutrality refers in this case to taxes 
that do not distort the relative prices of different goods or choices of productive 
factors and methods of finance. This norm suggests that equal tax rates should 
be applied to all ways of earning capital income (e.g., depreciable assets and 
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inventories) and to various types of capital income (dividends, interest, etc.). 
Neutrality is consistent with horizontal equity as well as efficient resource allo- 
cation. In this paper, economic neutrality is used as a norm against which to 
judge the incentives created by the tax system. 
Until recently, tax policy has been utilized as an instrument of social and 
economic engineering in Sweden. In particular, generous incentives were pro- 
vided for investment, in order to encourage industrialization; it was thought 
that tax-induced industrial production for export would assist in avoiding bal- 
ance of payments problems. 
Consistent with the egalitarian philosophical underpinnings of the welfare 
state, highly progressive taxes were levied on the income of  individuals. To- 
gether with the need to make up the revenue lost through investment incentives, 
this resulted in extremely high marginal tax rates on the incomes of individu- 
als; in  1980, the top marginal rate was above 85 percent, and 74 percent of 
full-time employees paid marginal tax rates in excess of 50 percent (Statistiska 
Meddelanden 1987, table 9.8.2).’ 
These high tax rates had  results  that  should have been anticipated. They 
discouraged saving and work effort (at least in the market economy-labor 
increasingly found untaxed outlets, e.g., in the “gray” economy and in self- 
maintenance of owner-occupied housing). Stuart (1981) estimates that 75 per- 
cent of the measured decline in GDP during the 1970s was a result of increas- 
ing home activities at the expense of market activities. Hansson (1984) calcu- 
lates the marginal cost for raising SKr 1 .OO by increased average and marginal 
taxes on labor in order to spend on transfers to be as large as SKr 7.20! 
High tax rates also created substantial incentives for illegal tax evasion and 
for legal tax avoidance-the  arrangement of transactions to escape taxes. Per- 
haps as important, the combination of high rates and structural imperfections 
created the opportunity for tax avoidance. These behavioral adjustments, which 
may not easily be reversed, can be particularly unfortunate if they undermine 
honesty and respect for the state.2 
Although individual income taxes were very high, corporate income taxes 
were generally quite low, once investment incentives are taken into account, 
despite statutory corporate rates in the neighborhood of 60 percent. Moreover, 
the corporate income tax was quite uneven in its effects. This is best seen by 
examining marginal effective tax rates (METRs), that is, the tax wedge be- 
tween the gross returns to investment and the net return  to the investor. On 
balance, considering all sources of funds, methods of finance, assets, and in- 
1. The rate referred to includes the income tax system but not the additional wedge from the 
social security system. 
2. Thus, Lindbeck (1993) suggests: “A  particularly problematic phenomenon in advanced wel- 
fare states is that the incentives to cheat on taxes and benefits are considerable. It becomes expen- 
sive to be honest; accordingly, the supply of honesty will gradually fall-even  in countries where 
honesty has originally been relatively pronounced, as in the Nordic countries. There is, therefore, 
a risk that high-tax welfare states will gradually depreciate the historically inherited ‘capital stock’ 
of  honesty, and it might be difficult, or at least take a long time, to restore it.” 111  Tax Policy in Sweden 
dustries, the METR under the Swedish corporate tax system was only about 2 
percent in 1980.3  Since, considering the effects of both the corporate and the 
owners’ income taxes, the overall METR was 37 percent, it is clear that, while 
investment in the Swedish corporate sector was heavily subsidized, saving was 
heavily taxed. 
One effect of such a constellation of marginal effective tax rates would have 
been the creation of incentives for foreigners to own Swedish industry, relative 
to a system with a more evenhanded treatment of saving and investment, except 
that the law limited the possibility for foreigners to hold shares in Swedish 
corporations before  1993. Instead, the incentives led primarily to increased 
ownership by domestic tax-favored institutions; household ownership fell from 
55 percent of the total value of quoted shares to 15 percent during the period 
1970-92 (see fig. 3.1). At the same time, domestic institutions (insurance com- 
panies, pension funds, etc.) increased their share from 40 to 67 percent. Since 
the  abolition of  limitations on foreign holdings  of  Swedish shares, foreign 
ownership has risen from 8 percent in 1990 to above 20 percent in 1994. 
The heavy subsidization of corporate investment is particularly anomalous 
since the taxation of returns to investment by foreigners (and low-taxed domes- 
tic entities) is one of the reasons commonly offered for the existence of corpo- 
rate income taxes. 
Beginning modestly in 1985, accelerating in 199 1, and continuing with the 
1994 changes, there has been a marked change in tax policy in Sweden. As in 
the rest of the world, the emphasis has shifted from redistribution and encour- 
agement of  investment to horizontal equity and economic neutrality. Invest- 
ment  incentives  have  been  reduced  dramatically.  These  and  other  base- 
broadening reforms have allowed equally dramatic reductions in the marginal 
tax rates applied to both individual and corporate income while maintaining 
revenues. Moreover, base broadening has prevented a sharp reduction in prog- 
ressivity since high-income earners typically have received low-taxed fringe 
benefits. 
Several important additional reforms have been enacted in the taxation of 
income from capital since 1991. In the beginning of  1992, the tax rate applied 
to capital gains was reduced from 30 to 25 percent. Beginning in  1994, the 
statutory corporate tax rate was reduced from 30 to 28 percent, and a deduction 
for dividends on new shares was aboli~hed.~  Instead, dividends from publicly 
held corporations were exempt from tax, and the capital gains rate was reduced 
once again to 12.5 percent. At the same time, the tax equalization fund system 
3. Note, however, that Sodersten (1991) estimates a METR of  -26  percent at an inflation rate 
of 10 percent-roughly  the rate prevailing at the time. For the difference in methodologies used 
by Sodersten and Norrman, see n. 21  below. 
4.  The “Anne11 deduction” allowed the corporation to deduct an amount from the corporate tax 
base equal to dividends paid out, up to  10 percent of new issued equity capital per year within 
twenty years from issue date and a maximum of  I00  percent of the issued amount. See sec. 3.4 
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(sum)  was replaced by a system allowing tax credits based purely on profits5 
These reforms had the effect of greatly  reducing the discrimination against 
new issues and retained earnings that survived the 199  1 reforms. 
Complexity has been one of the hallmarks of Swedish income tax policy. 
This can be seen in, among other things, the elaborate system of extra invest- 
ment allowances, the Annell deduction, the investment funds system, and the 
tax equalization fund. Perhaps equally important is the complexity that results 
from taxpayers’ efforts to avoid, or even evade, high tax rates and the efforts 
of the fiscal authorities to thwart avoidance and evasion. Such efforts are inevi- 
table if similar types of income are taxed very differently, as taxpayers will 
attempt to convert high-taxed income to low-taxed income. 
The  1991 and subsequent reforms  reduced  both  elements of  complexity. 
They eliminated the Annell deduction and most tax incentives for investment. 
They reduced the incentives and opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion 
by lowering tax rates and introducing schedular elements into the system as 
well as by curtailing investment incentives. 
The latter effect is particularly important and thus worthy of note. Argu- 
ments for global income taxation  assume implicitly that all income will be 
taxed as it accrues. In such a world, it makes sense to allow deductions for all 
expenses as they accrue. But asymmetric treatment of income and expenses- 
as when nominal interest expense is deducted currently but taxation of invest- 
ment income is deferred-is  a recipe for disaster. As taxpayers take advantage 
of  asymmetries to reduce their  taxes,  simplicity  suffers, along with  equity 
and neutrality. 
3.1.1  Alternative Models of Tax Policy 
Economists commonly espouse two alternative models of tax policy, both of 
which are (in their pure form) neutral with regard to the allocation of capital.6 
One model is based on the taxation  of  income, the other on the taxation  of 
consumption. It is common to identify consumption-based taxation with indi- 
rect taxes, such as the value added tax and excises. In fact, there is also a form 
of direct taxation that is tantamount to taxing consumption rather than income. 
Historically, direct taxation in Sweden has followed neither of these models 
closely. Rather, it has contained a mixture of provisions-some  of  which might 
be consistent with one or the other model-that,  in combination, create com- 
plexity and inequity and distort the allocation of capital. Given the importance 
of  this  distinction  and the disadvantage of adopting a “hybrid” system that 
5. In the former tax system, 30 percent of the equity capital at the end of  the accounting year 
(i.e,, including after-tax profits of  the year) formed the basis for additions to untaxed reserves 
called sum (tax equalization fund). In the new scheme, 25 percent of each year’s profits may be 
kept in a fund for a maximum of five years. Taken together, this means that, at an even level of 
profits over time, 125 percent of the yearly profit may be kept in such funds. 
6. For a description of the evolution of thinking about these two models, see McLure and Zo- 
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corresponds fully to neither model, the remainder of this section explains these 
two forms of  direct taxation.  The next  section presents  data  on sources of 
revenue. 
The Income Tax Model 
The traditional favorite (in theory, if not in practice) is the income tax model. 
In this model, the objective in the taxation of income from capital is to define 
the tax base to track economic income as closely as possible. Thus, deprecia- 
tion allowances should reflect economic depreciation, and there should not be 
any extra deductions or credits intended to encourage saving or investment. 
Inflation erodes the real value of depreciation allowances, the real cost of 
goods sold from inventories, and the real value of  outstanding  debt,  and it 
causes the overstatement of capital gains. Ad hoc measures, such as accelera- 
tion of  depreciation  allowances, are sometimes used to offset these effects. 
But, if the rate of inflation is high enough, explicit adjustment for inflation is 
required, as explained below. 
Some countries employ a “classical” system, in which corporate income and 
dividends received by shareholders are subject to separate tax regimes, with no 
attempt to integrate the two, in order to reduce double taxation of distributed 
earnings.  It has generally  been agreed that it is impossible  to integrate the 
individual  and corporate income taxes completely, for example, by treating 
corporations like partnerships (in which case, all profits would “flow through” 
to shareholders,  who would  pay tax  on them, instead  of being taxed at the 
entity level). But many advanced countries provide some sort of relief  from 
double taxation of dividends. The most commonly used means of providing 
dividend relief is the imputation system, in which the corporate income giving 
rise to dividends (but not income retained by the corporation) is attributed to 
shareholders, who are allowed a credit for the part of the corporate tax attribut- 
able to such income. An alternative that achieves the same result, at least in 
principle, is the “split-rate’’ system, under which corporations pay a lower tax 
on income that is distributed  than on income that is retained. Finally, some 
countries  simply exempt dividends from tax at the shareholder level; unlike 
the other two alternatives, this does not achieve the goal of taxing distributed 
corporate equity income at the tax rate of the shareholder if the corporate tax 
rate and the tax rate of the shareholder are not the same.’ 
7. Suppose that a corporation earns 1,000 of income, pays corporate tax of 50 percent, distrib- 
utes 400 of after-tax income to a taxpayer subject to a marginal tax rate of 60 percent, and retains 
100. Under the imputation system, the shareholder would pay personal tax of  480 on grossed-up 
dividends of  800 (the amount needed to pay dividends of 400, given the corporate tax rate of 50 
percent); net of  the imputation credit of  400 the shareholder’s tax would be 80. Under the split- 
rate system, the income giving rise to dividends would not be  subject to corporate tax; thus, the 
corporation could distribute 800, on which the shareholder would pay  tax of 480, as under the 
imputation system. Finally, if dividends were exempt from shareholder tax, distributed corporate- 
source equity income would be  subject only to the corporate-level tax of 400, or 50 percent, in- 
stead of  the shareholder tax of 480, or 60 percent. 115  Tax Policy in Sweden 
In the absence of  integration and inflation (or if there is perfect inflation 
adjustment  of  the  measurement  of  income),  income taxation  produces  an 
entity-level effective tax rate on income from equity investment that is equal 
to the statutory rate.8 Under the classical system, distributed earnings are then 
subject to taxation when received by shareholders, producing an aggregate ef- 
fective tax rate that exceeds both the corporate and the individual statutory 
rates. The object of dividend relief is to reduce this aggregate tax to the statu- 
tory marginal rate of shareholders (in the case of the imputation and split-rate 
systems) or the corporation (in the case of the exemption of dividends). In the 
case of income on debt-financed investment, the entity-level tax is zero, but the 
effective tax rate paid by the debtholder is the statutory rate; thus, the aggregate 
effective rate of tax is the statutory rate of the debtholder. 
These results-an  effective  corporate tax  rate  on  income  from  equity- 
financed investment equal to the statutory rate, a zero corporate effective rate 
on income from debt-financed investment, and aggregate effective rates on dis- 
tributed earnings and interest equal to the statutory rate of the recipient-pro- 
vide a useful benchmark against which to appraise the  Swedish tax system. 
While a pure income tax distorts the choice between saving and consumption, 
and thus the levels of  saving and investment, by  taxing future consumption 
more heavily than present consumption, it does not distort current decisions 
on the allocation of funds between competing investments. 
Inflation generally causes income from capital to be measured inaccurately. 
This is most easily seen in the case of the sale of a capital asset that was bought 
for 100 and sold for 300 following a period during which prices have doubled. 
In the absence of inflation adjustment, tax would be paid on the nominal gain 
of 200 rather than on the real gain of  100; if prices had quadrupled, tax would 
again be levied on 200, despite a real loss of 100. Similar reasoning applies to 
the cost of goods sold from inventory and to depreciation allowances; only 
explicit adjustment of purchase prices for the increase in the general price level 
generally avoids mismeasurement of in~ome.~  Allowance of deductions for the 
full nominal amount of interest expense and inclusion of nominal interest in- 
come in taxable income also cause income to be misstated; accurate measure- 
ment of income would recognize that part of nominal interest payments com- 
pensate only for the loss of real value resulting from the erosion of principal- 
and that it may even fail to do that fully, in the case of unexpected inflation. In 
calculating marginal effective tax rates in a world of inflation, it is necessary 
to take account of these effects. 
8. It is difficult to differentiate clearly between corporate and  shareholder taxes in  the case 
of the imputation system. The interpretation of aggregate (corporate and individual) tax rates is 
more straightforward. 
9. It is sometimes thought that the use of last-in, first-out (LIFO) accounting for inventories 
avoids this problem. In fact, the use of  LIFO eliminates the effects of  shifts in relative prices as 
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The Consumption Tax Model 
The second competing model for tax policy is the consumption-based direct 
tax. Under it, immediate deduction (expensing) is allowed for all business pur- 
chases, including depreciable assets and additions to inventories. (Thus, there 
are no depreciation allowances and no deductions for cost of goods sold.) As 
a result of expensing, the marginal effective entity-level tax rate on income 
from equity-financed investment is zero.’O There are two alternative methods 
of  treating debt, at both the entity level and the debtholder level. One is to 
ignore debt entirely; thus, interest is neither taxable nor deductible. The other 
is to treat interest as under the income tax but to include proceeds of borrowing 
in the tax base and allow a deduction for lending and the repayment of debt. 
These two methods are (under rather stringent circumstances) equivalent in 
present-value terms to each other and to the exemption of interest income and 
expense. In short, the marginal effective tax rate on income from business and 
capital under the consumption-based direct tax is identically zero for both enti- 
ties and individuals (again, under stringent assumptions). This result is invari- 
ant to the rate of inflation (other than that between the time an asset is bought 
and the time a deduction is taken for it) since inflation does not have the chance 
to erode the value of expensed purchases and either debt is ignored for tax 
purposes or the effect of inflation on the real value of debt principal and inter- 
est offset each other. 
Like the results for the pure income tax, the results for the consumption- 
based direct tax-zero  marginal effective tax rates-provide  a useful bench- 
mark for the appraisal of the Swedish tax system. Besides being neutral with 
regard to the saving-consumption choice (unlike the income tax) as well as the 
allocation of current investment (like the income tax), the zero METR inherent 
in the consumption-based direct tax is potentially attractive for a small open 
economy that is interested in attracting foreign investment.” 
Problems with “Hybrid”  Systems 
No country applies either of these models in its pure form. The failure to 
utilize the consumption tax model can be explained by several factors, includ- 
ing the novelty of the idea, the distributional implications of  exempting the 
10. One way  of seeing this is to think of the government as a partner in all investments. When 
a taxpayer subject to a 40 percent tax rate makes an investment, that taxpayer must put up only 60 
percent of the funds for the investment; the government contributes the rest, in the form of reduced 
tax receipts. Then the taxpayer receives 60 percent of the return and the government the rest. Since 
the taxpayer receives 60 percent of the return on 60 percent of the investment, the taxpayer’s mar- 
ginal effective tax rate is zero. 
1 1. The issue is more complicated than this. The zero METR would presumably be attractive to 
investors from countries that exempt foreign-source income but not necessarily to those from 
countries that tax the worldwide income of their investors and allow credits for source-country 
taxes-unless  such investors have excess foreign tax credits or defer repatriation of earnings. Also, 
the fear that the consumption-based direct tax might not be eligible for foreign tax credits has thus 
far prevented any country from adopting such a tax, except for small businesses. 117  Tax Policy in Sweden 
return from capital, problems of transition, and uncertainty about whether the 
United States (and perhaps other countries that tax the worldwide income of 
their taxpayers) would allow credits for taxes paid to source countries using 
the consumption model. Even so, the tax laws of many countries contain pro- 
visions that are consistent with the consumption tax model. These do not, by 
themselves, constitute a coherent consumption-based tax, and they are incon- 
sistent with the income tax model. 
The tax laws of all countries contain provisions that are inconsistent with 
the income tax model, which commonly forms the conceptual basis for such 
laws. Among common examples are the acceleration of depreciation allow- 
ances and the exemption of  certain forms of  income. Few countries provide 
comprehensive inflation  adjustment for the measurement  of  income, except 
those experiencing high rates of  inflation, but many laws include provisions 
that have been justified as ad hoc responses to inflation; accelerated deprecia- 
tion is one of these. Such ad hoc provisions are unlikely to compensate ade- 
quately for inflation, except at one level of inflation. 
Inconsistent treatment of various transactions, including piecemeal adoption 
of selected features of the consumption tax model (e.g., expensing of deprecia- 
ble assets while providing income tax treatment of interest expense) and the 
failure to deal with inflation in a comprehensive manner, creates opportunities 
for tax planning or “tax arbitrage.” Steuerle (1985,2) provides a description of 
tax arbitrage and its effects that is worth quoting at length because it describes 
so well what happened during the 1980s in Sweden as well as in the United 
States: 
Tax and loan considerations come together in part through tax arbitrage- 
basically a process whereby taxpayers borrow for the purpose of purchasing 
[tax-]preferred assets. The difference in the tax treatment of receipts of pre- 
ferred income, on the one hand, and deductions of interest  payments  re- 
ceived  [sic],  on the other, has an enormous effect on almost all investment 
decisions. Tax arbitrage is an important determinant of  which investments 
are made, of who will own particular types of assets, and how large aggre- 
gate demand will be for loans. Many loans and tax reductions are provided 
to persons who play tax arbitrage “games” in which no additional saving or 
investment is generated in the economy. . . . 
All these problems are exacerbated by inflation. A higher inflation rate 
raises interest rates and usually makes tax arbitrage more profitable per dol- 
lar of borrowing  and investment. Some investment uses capital unproduc- 
tively because the value of output made possible by  the investment is actu- 
ally less than the cost of the investment itself. 
The overall result of the “Chinese menu” approach to tax policy (some provi- 
sions from the income tax column and some from the consumption tax col- 
umn) is the distortion of economic choices, inequities, the perception that the 
system is unfair, and complexity, as efforts are made to prevent abuse. 
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calculate marginal effective tax rates (METRs). The METR is the percentage 
by  which taxation reduces the return to capital on an investment that, in the 
absence of taxation, would be on the borderline between being worthwhile and 
not being worthwhile. Such calculations consider the effects of  inflation, as 
well as the provisions of tax law, and can be calculated for the corporate and 
individual income tax separately or for the two combined. METRs can exceed 
100 percent, or they can be negative; negative METRs occur when the “after- 
tax” return to an investment exceeds the before-tax return, implying that the 
tax system provides a subsidy. If depreciation is accelerated, the marginal ef- 
fective tax rate on income from equity-financed investment falls below the 
statutory rate. If  the cost of depreciable assets can be deducted in the year of 
acquisition, the METR on income from equity-financed investments is zero. 
(The deduction reduces the net cost of the investment by a percentage equal to 
the statutory tax rate; since taxation reduces the return to the investment by the 
same fraction, the effect is the same as if there were no taxation.) If  interest 
deductions are allowed for investment that benefits from accelerated deprecia- 
tion, the METR at the corporate level can be negative. Combining consumption 
tax treatment of depreciable assets (expensing) with allowance of interest de- 
ductions creates large subsidies to debt-financed investments. This is espe- 
cially true where deductions are allowed for the full amount of  interest ex- 
pense, with no adjustment for inflation. 
3.1.2  The Prereform Swedish Model 
Direct taxation in Sweden has followed neither the income tax nor the con- 
sumption tax model; it was more accurately characterized as a hybrid system. 
This can be seen by examining structural features of the Swedish income tax. 
In 1980, the personal income tax included, in principle, all returns to capital. 
The sum of  capital income and labor income was taxed at graduated rates. 
Despite the appearance of progressive taxation (at least intended progressi- 
vity), the outcome was, in reality, not progressive. Because provisions consis- 
tent with the consumption tax model were combined with income tax provis- 
ions, there were opportunities for tax arbitrage. 
The deviation from the pure income tax model consisted in three main cir- 
cumstances. First, inflation adjustment depended on type of asset. Second, cap- 
ital gains were taxed when assets were sold, not when accrued. Third, the re- 
turn to some assets was tax exempt. 
While interest income and interest expense were (and still are) taxed on a 
nominal basis without inflation adjustment, capital gains on shares were fully 
taxable only if realized within two years after acquisition; only 40 percent of 
gains on assets held for more than two years were subject to tax. Moreover, 
imputed income from owner-occupied houses and any capital gain on real es- 
tate were assessed on an inflation-adjusted basis. This, together with the deduc- 
tion for mortgage interest, provided  an  attractive opportunity for tax  arbi- 
trage-borrowing  to invest in owner-occupied housing. 
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gains was lower than the statutory rate. In this situation, the owner of the asset 
may explicitly postpone taxation of a gain until the asset is sold. This implies 
an interest-free loan from the government to the taxpayer, compared to the pure 
income tax situation. One problem, seen from the standpoint of  the govern- 
ment, is that the taxpayer may chose to liquidate assets with losses as soon as 
they accrue while the taxation of capital gains is postponed. In principle, there 
are two ways to solve this problem. The first one is when capital losses only 
may be deducted from capital gains. The second one is to admit only a fraction 
of the loss to be deducted from ordinary income. In 1980, the first principle 
was used. 
Apart from the implicit return to consumer durables, primarily pension capi- 
tal was tax exempt and therefore treated in accordance with the consumption 
tax model. Contributions were deductible and therefore exempt from income 
tax. As a result, the tax on the part of the income that was saved could also be 
saved with the government as a sleeping partner. When the pension finally was 
paid out, the government withdrew its investment. Since no taxation took place 
at the fund level, this implies that the effective rate on pension capital was zero 
(see also n. 10 above). 
The investment incentives that have been available at various times are more 
consistent  with the consumption tax  model than  the income tax model. In 
present-value terms, they were in some cases (investment in machinery) more 
generous than immediate expensing; that is, the present value of the deductions 
for depreciation allowances including the value of the investment grants ex- 
ceeded 100 percent of  the investment outlays. Combined with the continued 
existence of full deduction for nominal interest expenses, they resulted in nega- 
tive METRs. 
3.1.3  The 1985 and 1991 Tax Reforms 
The development between 1985 and 1991 is best characterized as rate reduc- 
ing  and  neutrality  increasing. The  top  marginal  income tax  rate  on  labor 
dropped from 80 percent in 1985 to 5  1 percent in 199  1. The total top marginal 
effect  fell  from  88  to  74  percent.12 Neutrality  was  increased  by  base- 
broadening measures. Most fringe benefits became taxable income valued at 
market price, and the tax subsidy to interest expenses was reduced from 50 to 
30 percent. The system was moved toward the income tax model as the returns 
to pension capital were taxed at the fund level, first by a special tax in 1987 
(engingsskatten) and then, from 1991, by a permanent tax. A main principle 
for the taxation of capital income was introduced in 1991; all returns should 
be taxed at 30 percent without inflation adjustment. At a rate of inflation of 4 
percent and a real rate of interest of  3 percent, this implied a tax rate of 70 
percent in real terms. 
Still, there  were several exceptions from the pure income tax model. As 
12. This number includes taxation within the social security system, taxes on goods, and mar- 
ginal effects due to income-dependent housing allowances. 120  Erik Norrman and Charles E. McLure Jr. 
mentioned, inflation was not considered. Also, capital gains were taxed (and 
still are) on realization, not when accrued. Seventy percent of losses could be 
deducted from ordinary income instead of from capital gains. Certain types of 
income were also taxed  at a lower rate-primarily  capital gains on owner- 
occupied housing and special tax-favored savings accounts and funds. 
The most important part of the reform was, however, the substitution of pro- 
gressive capital income taxation by proportional taxation. This took place by 
separating taxation  of capital income from that of  labor income. The main 
objective was to achieve a better correspondence between intended and actual 
taxation of labor income by reducing the possibility  of affecting the taxation 
of labor income by interest expenses. 
Corporate taxation  was also designed in order to increase neutrality. The 
statutory tax rate was decreased to 30 percent, while possibilities  to build up 
untaxed reserves were reduced substantially. These had earlier been associated 
with certain types of assets and had therefore strongly affected the investment 
choice. In  1991, a new possibility  based on the own capital of  the firm was 
introduced-the  tax equalization reserve. In this way, the importance of  the 
composition of  assets in the company for tax reasons was considerably re- 
duced. 
In  1994, the right-wing government  took a further step toward  neutrality 
in the financial decisions of  corporations by abolishing the economic double 
taxation  of corporate profits. In principle, dividends distributed by  Swedish 
corporations became tax exempt, and the tax rate on capital gains was set at 
12.5 percent. The system was thereby brought more in line with the pure in- 
come tax model. However, the new Social Democratic government has decided 
to reintroduce double taxation of corporate profits, which will also reintroduce 
distortions in corporate financial decisions. 
3.2  Statistics Describing the Swedish Tax System 
3.2.1  Macro Data 
Taxation may be characterized in several ways. Here, we begin by describing 
the total tax burden and continue by analyzing the structure. 
Figure 3.2 and table 3.1 illustrate the development of total tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP in Sweden, the United States, and the average of the OECD 
countries from 1955 to the present. Figure 3.10 below shows the situation in 
1992 for each OECD country. During the period  1955-91,  tax revenues rose 
in Sweden from 25.5 to 53 percent of GDP, while they increased from 24 to 
only 39 percent on average in OECD countries. This implies a radically more 
rapid growth of tax revenues in Sweden than in other developed countries. An 
expected consequence of this expansion should be rising welfare costs of taxa- 
tion owing to increasing distortions in the economy. 121  Tax Policy in Sweden 
Table 3.1  Total Tax Revenues as a Percentage of GDP 
1955  1965  1975  1985  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Sweden  25.5  35.2  43.6  50.4  56.9  53.2  51.1  50.3 
United States  23.6  25.8  29.0  28.7  29.5  29.8  29.4  N.A 
OECD: 
Europe  25.1  27.5  34.1  38.8  40.0  40.4  N.A.  N.A. 
Unweightedaverage  24.0  26.7  32.9  37.1  38.6  38.7  N.A.  N.A. 
Sources: Revenue statistics of OECD member countries (OECD 1993). except for Sweden in 1993, 
which is from Konjunkturinstitutet (1994). 
Note: N.A. = not available. 
An even more striking picture appears when public expenditures as a per- 
centage of GDP are reported (see table 3.2). In 1965, public expenditures were 
36.1 percent in Sweden, 27.9 percent in the United States, and 36.2 percent on 
average in OECD Europe. By 1992, they had increased to 67.3 percent in Swe- 
den but  to only 35.4 percent in the United  States and 50.7 percent in the 
OECD. Since expenditures must always be financed and it may be necessary 
to raise future taxes to repay public debt, this measure is more appropriate than 
the ratio of taxes to GDP when evaluating the burden of the public sector. The 
discrepancy between revenues and expenditures also has important genera- 
tional implications. 
Over time, an increasing share of total tax revenues has been derived from 
consumption taxation. This can be seen most clearly in the relative growth of 
revenues from indirect taxes. 
Since the typical feature of the consumption tax model is that the effective 
tax rate on capital income is zero, one way of evaluating the extent of income 
taxation is to look at the total amount of taxes on capital income compared to 
taxes on labor income. In 1965, taxes on capital income constituted 11 percent 
of total tax revenues, while, in  1991, they were below 7 percent. However, 
behind these numbers there are changes toward both models. 
The great movement toward consumption taxation is seen in the increasing 
part of tax revenues raised by social security fees based on labor income. Since 
returns to capital are not affected by these fees, increasing social security fees 
implies a move from income taxation to consumption taxation. In 1965, they 
amounted to 12 percent of total tax revenues but had increased to 32 percent 
in 199  1. Although higher social security fees are accompanied by more social 
security benefits, it is clear that a large part of the fees may be considered as 
pure taxes. 
Table 3.3 reports the structure of taxation in Sweden, the United States, and 
OECD Europe for 1965, 1990, and 1991. Figure 3.11 below shows the situa- 
tion in 1991 for the OECD countries. It is striking that Swedish taxes on per- 
sonal income were a substantially higher multiple of OECD taxes of the same 
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Fig. 3.2  Tax revenues as a percentage of GDP 








income tax in Sweden has been roughly offset by greater reliance on payroll 
taxes, especially the expansion of  social security contributions. This change 
implies a shift from progressive taxation to proportional. A possible explana- 
tion for this shift may be the relative ease in increasing the tax burden in this 
way compared to increased income taxation. Other possible interpretations in- 123  Tax Policy in Sweden 
Table 3.2  Total Government Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP 
1965  1975  1985  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Sweden  36.1  48.4  63.3  59.1  61.5  67.3  73.6 
United States  27.9  33.5  33.2  33.3  34.2  35.4  N.A. 
OECD: 
Europe, weighted averagea  36.2  43.7  49.2  47.8  49.4  50.7  N.A. 
Total, weighted averagea  32.0  36.2  39.5  39.0  40.0  41.2  N.A. 
Sources: OECD, Economic Outlook, nos. 34 and 53, except for Sweden in 1993, which is from 
Konjunkturinstitutet (1994). 
Note: N.A. = not available 
“GDP weights. 
Table 3.3  Different Taxes as Percentage of Total Taxation 
1965  1990  1991 
United  OECD 
Sweden  States  Europe 
Personal income  48.7  30.5  25.0 
Profits  6.1  15.8  6.4 
Goods and services  3 1.2  2 1.9  40.1 
Social security  12.1  16.4  21.6 
Wealth and property  1.8  15.3  6.7 
Other taxes 
United 
Sweden  States 
37.9  35.8 
3.1  7.4 
24.6  16.5 
30.8  29.5 









United  OECD 
Sweden  States  Europe 
34.0  34.9  28.1 
3.1  7.3  6.4 
27.1  16.8  32.1 
31.7  29.8  27.2 
4.1  11.2  4.4 
1.5 
Souce: Revenue statistics of OECD member countries (OECD 1993). 
clude the demise of redistribution as a prime goal for tax policy and the possi- 
bility  that taxpayers perceive a strong link between payroll  taxes and social 
security benefits. An important question in this context is the extent to which 
social security fees are actually seen as taxes or as substitutes for private insur- 
ance premiums. If they are seen as akin to insurance premiums that purchase 
increased benefits, they are not likely to have the adverse incentive effects com- 
monly attributed to high taxes. 
Table 3.3 also shows the effects of the tax reform of  1991 on the structure 
of taxation. The share of revenues stemming from the personal income tax fell 
sharply, while the share from taxes on goods and services rose. This reflects 
the elimination of the central government income tax for most income earners, 
in combination with the broadened tax base of the value added tax. 
Another recent development in the Swedish tax structure is the decline in 
corporate taxes and the rise in taxes on wealth and immovable property. This is 
probably a consequence of international economic integration. An interesting 
question in this context is the relation between taxes on the income and con- 
sumption of individuals (individual income tax, social security fees, and taxes 
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Source: See tables 3.4 and 3.5. 
on the other hand. The proportion of the first type of taxes rose from about 87 
percent in  1955 to 93 percent in  1991. This does not, however, necessarily 
imply that the taxation of capital income declined during the period since indi- 
vidual income includes returns to capital and social security contributions may 
not fully be viewed as taxes, as pointed out above. A more exact analysis of 
this issue is therefore reported in table 3.4 and shown in figures 3.3 and 3.4. 
Taxes on capital income can be defined as taxes that drive a wedge between 125  Tax Policy in Sweden 
Table 3.4  Average Taxes on Labor and Capital 
1965  1970 
Taxes on labor income:" 
As a percentage of 
GDP 
As a percentage of 
labor income 
Adjusted measureb 
Taxes on capital income: 
Corporate tax, as a 
percentage of GDP 
Tax on ownership, as 
a percentage of  GDP 
Total, as a percentage 
of  capital income 
Total taxes: 































































































Source: Nonman (1995a). 
"Taxes on labor income include income taxes on labor, social security fees, and taxes on goods and ser- 
vices. 
hThe adjusted measure is calculated as percentage of  labor income and considers to what extent social 
security benefits and subsidies reduce taxes. 
the gross return to capital and the net return to the investor. All other taxes are 
treated  as taxes on labor income. Using this definition, taxes on goods and 
services are taxes on labor. Taxes on labor have grown in step with the growth 
of total taxation during the period 1965-92.  This is not surprising since labor 
income constitutes between 78 and 88 percent of total factor incomes net of 
depreciation during the period and therefore must serve as the major source of 
tax revenues. 
Taxation of labor income has increased from 45.1 to 68.2 percent of such 
income during this period. A substantial part of this development can be traced 
to the expansion of the social security system, which includes pension benefits, 
sickness insurance, work injury insurance, work environment protection, and 
wage guarantees. The calculation of an alternative measure that considers this 
fact seems appropriate. Table 3.4 reports an adjusted measure of taxes on labor 
income. The measure considers the extent to which  social security benefits 
offset the tax component of the contributions. Further, it also includes an as- 
sessment of the size of negative consumption taxes, that is, subsidies that re- 
duce the effective tax rate on consumption. A more detailed description of the 
calculations is found in Nonman (1995a). The adjusted measure discloses both 126  Erik Norrman and Charles E. McLure Jr. 
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Fig. 3.4  Average and marginal tax rates on capital income 
Source: See tables 3.4  and 3.5. 
a lower level of  taxation of labor income and less rapid growth, from 40.3 to 
53.5 percent. 
Another way to investigate how taxes influence the situation for households 
is to look at the importance of transfers in relation to total disposable income. 
This is obviously closely related to the development of  the welfare state. In 
1975, labor and capital income constituted 65.8 percent of disposable income 
for all households and 85.8 percent for households eighteen to sixty-four years 127  Tax Policy in Sweden 
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Fig. 3.5  Statutory and marginal effective corporate tax rates on 
marginal investments 
Source: See tables 3.6  and 3.12. 
of age. In 1990, the corresponding numbers were 61.3 and 79.4 percent. These 
numbers reflect the fact that taxable transfers as part of disposable income 
increased during this period (Jansson and Sandqvist 1 993).13 
When it comes to taxes on capital income, the numbers reported reflect the 
other side of the same coin; capital income provides only a small tax base. 
What is more interesting is the fact that capital income appears to be taxed at 
13. Taxable transfers are typically income related and substitutes for ordinary income. 128  Erik Norrman and Charles E. McLure Jr. 
a lower rate on average than labor income. A qualification should be made 
here, however. The tax system has only to a minor extent been constructed to 
adjust for the effects of inflation. (A lender must, e.g., pay tax on his or her 
nominal interest income no matter whether the inflation rate is 0 or 10 percent.) 
Since the national accounts do not consider changes in the real value of capital 
in calculating income from capital, inflation causes underestimation of the real 
tax rates on capital income. However, if  households respond to inflation by 
investing in real assets and keeping negative financial holdings, which typi- 
cally has been the case in Sweden during the 1970s and 1980s, inflation may 
decrease the tax rate on capital instead of increasing it. A reasonable conclu- 
sion is that middle-aged  households, who generally keep negative financial 
assets, have profited from inflation while elderly people have incurred losses 
on their positive financial holdings. 
Taxation of  labor displays  a  steady  growth  during the  period  1965-90, 
whereas taxation of capital exhibits a U-shaped form over time, with relatively 
high rates in the beginning of the period, followed by low rates around 1980, 
and a sharp increase in the 1980s. It is also noticeable that taxes on immovable 
capital have grown substantially during the latter part of  the period. Finally, 
the reform of  1991 marks a change in the course of  tax policy; taxation of 
labor was decreased considerably, while taxation of capital was increased. 
3.2.2  Micro Data 
Average tax rates are not as important as marginal tax rates in analyzing the 
influence of the tax system on the behavior of individuals and corporations. 
Table 3.5 presents calculations of the average and top marginal tax rates and 
marginal  effective tax rates  on labor and capital income during the period 
1965-93.  The latter numbers include the influence of income-related transfers 
such as child care. 
Figure 3.3 shows an increase in the average marginal tax rates and effective 
tax rates on labor income from the beginning of the period to the middle, fol- 
lowed by a decline toward the level that was prevailing around 1970. For indi- 
viduals facing the top marginal effective tax rates, the most important event is 
the drop in the early 1990s from above 80 percent to nearly 70 percent. Also 
noticeable is the fact that the average marginal effective tax rates in the middle 
of  the  1980s were higher  than  the top marginal  effective tax  rates  in the 
1990s. 
The development of capital income taxation (see fig. 3.4) is similar to that 
of labor income taxation, except that the drop is still greater at the beginning 
of the 1990s.  Again, the effects of inflation are not included in these numbers. 
We add two more numbers of importance in order to assess the incentives 
of  the tax system on portfolio composition. First, the marginal effective tax 
rates on capital income reported above relate to the taxation of current income, 
that is, interest payments and dividends. There were no limitations on the de- 
duction of interest expenses until the beginning of the 1980s.  Thus, during the 
1970s, it became common to deduct interest expense against labor income that 129  Tax Policy in Sweden 
Table 3.5  Average and Top Marginal Tax Rates on Labor and Capital Income 
1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Labor income: 
Average marginal tax 
ratea  42.2  47.4  53.4  56.8  50.2  52.1  39.0  39.0  39.0 
Average marginal 
effective tax ratea  54.5  61.8  69.6  73.4  71.3  73.4  67.1  64.6  61.4 
Topmarginal tax rate  71.0  72.4  82.2  85.0  80.0  66.2  51.2  51.0  51.0 
Top marginal 
effective tax rate  76.0  77.6  86.1  88.7  88.0  80.6  73.5  71.2  70.3 
Capital income: 
Average marginal tax 
rateb  42.2  47.4  53.4  56.8  50.2  52.1  30.0  30.0  30.0 
Top marginal tax 
rateb  71.0  72.4  82.2  85.0  80.0  66.2  30.0  30.0  30.0 
Effective tax rate on 
capital gains on 
shares  .O  7.5  8.2  28.7  25.1  23.5  16.6  13.9  13.9 
Maximum value of 
interest deduction  71.0  72.4  82.2  85.0  50.0  40.0  30.0  30.0  30.0 
Source: Norman (1995a) 
'Average  marginal tax rates are calculated as the weighted average over all income groups of their mar- 
ginal tax rates. Effective rates include social security fees, taxes on goods and services, and housing allow- 
ances. 
bThe effective tax rates equal the marginal tax rates. 
would otherwise be taxed at high tax rates in response to increasing marginal 
tax rates. 
Second, the effective tax rate on capital gains on shares is calculated assum- 
ing an average holding period of ten years. The possibility of deducting interest 
payments combined with the low tax on capital gains (e.g., from investment in 
real estate) provided an easy way to convert high-taxed labor income into low- 
taxed capital income. This possibility seems to be much smaller after the 1991 
tax reform. Together with abnormally high real interest rates and the deep re- 
cession, this has contributed to the sharp decline of the real estate market. 
As was shown in table 3.3 above, corporate taxation fell during the period 
1965-91.  Figure 3.5 shows the statutory tax rates on corporate profits during 
the period  1980-95.  The tax rate was raised in the mid-1980s owing to the 
introduction of the profit-sharing tax (which was applied only on profits above 
a certain level). The purpose of the tax was to finance the so-called wage earn- 
ers' fund system (Lontagarfonderna). In the mid- 1980s, corporate taxation at 
the local government level was abolished. The numbers in table 3.6, also shown 
in figure 3.5, are calculated given the profit-sharing tax and the deductibility 
of the local tax before the change in the tax system. 
We return to the tax wedges on different types of investments and their fi- 
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Fig. 3.6  Statutory and actual tax rate on labor earnings-top  decile 
Source: Malmer, Person, and Tengblad (1994). 
3.3  Distributional Effects of Taxation 
3.3.1  Incidence Studies 
The data presented in the previous section show that there have been strong 
incentives for high-income earners to borrow in order to invest in low-taxed 
assets and to own relatively small amounts of  taxable ~ea1th.l~  The ability to 
use tax planning to avoid progression would also mean less income redistnbu- 
14. Low taxation could be within either the income tax system or the wealth tax. 131  Tax Policy in Sweden 
Table 3.6  Statutory Corporate Tax Rates 
1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Including profit-sharing tax  50.3  52.6  55.1  57.4  61.6  52.0  30.0  30.0  30.0 
Excludingprofit-sharing tax  50.3  52.6  55.1  57.4  52.0  40.0  30.0  30.0  30.0 
Sources: Hansson (1983),  Statistiska Meddelanden (1992). Statistiska Centralbyrin (1992), and own cal- 
culations. 
tion than implied by the highly progressive personal income tax schedule. All 
these expectations were more or less confirmed by several studies during the 
1980s (see, e.g., Age11 and Edin 1988; Hansson and Norrman 1986; and Jans- 
son 1990).  The results of one of these are reported in table 3.7. 
Column 1 of table 3.7  shows the distribution of taxes on personal income, 
as defined by the tax code for 1985. Since lower deciles were paying a lower 
and higher deciles a higher proportion  of  income in taxes, compared to the 
average tax rate, it is obvious that the tax schedule was progres~ive.’~  However, 
if taxable deductions for negative capital income are eliminated from the defi- 
nition of income (the denominator in the calculation), the degree of progres- 
sion is much lower since interest deductions are claimed disproportionately by 
those with high incomes.16 This is confirmed by the fact that the tax rate for 
people in high deciles was substantially lower if  taxes are compared to the 
assessed income before such deductions, as in column 2. The presence of huge 
deductions at the top of the income scale dramatically reduced the “effective” 
progression compared to the statutory one.” 
In order better to capture the living standard of households, the third column 
of table 3.7 relates taxes to household income corrected for the effects of infla- 
tion on the value of monetary assets, for certain nontaxable transfers, and for 
the  number  of  household members  (consumer units). This  computation in- 
creases the calculated tax rate for low-income households and decreases it for 
high-income households. 
Further  study  shows clearly  that  capital  income  taxation,  especially  the 
asymmetries in the taxation  of different returns to capital mentioned above, 
decreased the progressivity of taxes on labor income. In 1985, the deciles with 
low income were paying a higher fraction of their capital income in taxes than 
15. Another conclusion from the investigation was that progression was reduced when deciles 
were calculated according to income of households compared to income of individuals. The under- 
lying explanation was that low-income individuals typically are living with someone who earns 
more than they themselves do, while high-income earners live with people who are paid less. 
16. If  someone had  a labor income of  200,000, paid 50,000 in taxes, and claimed a 75,000 
interest deduction, the tax rate in relation to assessed income (125,000) would be 40 percent 
(50/125),  but it would be only 25 percent in relation to the income before the deduction (50/200). 
17. This conclusion is obvious since capital income is taxed on a realization basis; i.e., accrued 
capital gains on funds invested in appreciating assets are not included in  the income concept. 
Further, returns to consumer durables were not included in the tax base. Since high-income earners 
typically invested borrowed funds in these “low-taxed” assets, the income concept used for taxa- 
tion did not manage to capture their full income. 132  Erik Norman and Charles E. McLure Jr. 
Table 3.7  The Distribution of Tax Burdens, 1985 (taxes as a percentage 
of income) 
Basis for Comparison 
Assessed Income  Assessed Income  Gross IncomeA  per 
after Deductions  before Deductions  Consumer Units 









































Average  33.6  30.6  30.4 
Source: Hansson and Nonman (1986). 
"Gross income is defined as assessed income corrected for inflationary gains and losses on mone- 
tary assets plus nontaxable transfers and a real return to owner-occupied housing. 
deciles with high income (see table 3.8). Indeed, high-income households re- 
ported negative capital income. This reflected in part the effect of borrowing 
by higher-income groups, but it may also be interpreted as a consequence of 
low taxes on securities with high risk. (See also the effective tax rates on capi- 
tal gains on shares reported in table 3.5 above.) Since retired individuals typi- 
cally save in low-risk securities and have low incomes, they were the ones who 
faced the high tax rates on capital income. 
The picture has changed with the tax reform of  199  1. A study of the effects 
of the reform shows that the gap between the statutory tax on labor income- 
a simulated tax-and  tax actually levied decreased substantially for individu- 
als in the top decile of  the income distribution between  1980 and 1991 (see 
Malmer, Persson, and Tengblad 1994, chap. lo).'* In 1980, the simulated tax 
on labor income was 52 percent, while the actual tax was 42 percent. In 1991, 
the simulated tax was 41 percent and the levied tax 40 percent. The main expla- 
nation is that, while tax rates were being reduced (thus lowering the simulated 
tax), borrowing  has become considerably  more expensive compared to the 
1980s since the tax subsidy to interest expenses has decreased from over 85 
percent in  1980 to only 30 percent in  1991 (preventing a large drop in the 
actual rate). 
The fact that, although marginal tax rates have been cut substantially, the 
18. Malmer, Persson, and Tengblad's  investigation is based on individuals twenty to sixty-four 
years of  age and on their individual income, but the conclusion that is drawn here would hardly 
be affected if deciles were formed according to household income. 133  Tax Policy in Sweden 
Table 3.8  Capital Income Taxation, 1985 (capital income taxes as a percentage 
of income) 
Basis for Comparison 
Potential Income 
per Consumer Units 
Decile  Consumer Units  45-55  Years of Age 
Gross Income per 
1  4.5  8.7 
2  3.0  -  .5 
3  .5  -  .8 
4  -  .4  -  .6 
5  -2.1  -.l 
6  -1.7  -1.8 
7  .2  -3.5 
8  -  .9  -1.0 
9  -2.2  -2.5 
10  -1.7  -1.7 
Average  -.9 
Gini coefficients: 
Without capital income taxation  20.6 
With capital income taxation  21.7 
-  1.2 
25.5 
25.9 
Source: Hansson and Norrman (1986). 
average tax rate is roughly the same for individuals in decile 10 in 1991 as in 
1980 is shown in another way in table 3.9 and illustrated in figure 3.6. Over 
the whole period, the total simulated individual income tax was decreased by 
SKr 16 billion; while the simulated tax on labor income was lowered by SKr 
33 billion; the difference is an increase in the simulated taxation of returns to 
capital. Although simulated taxes on labor income were cut by more than SKr 
17 billion for decile 10, actual levied taxes decreased only by SKr 3.5 billion. 
Base broadening prevented the simulated tax reductions from becoming real 
for high-income individuals. For deciles 1-7,  the tax reform had little effect on 
tax subsidies to income from capital. For them, the changes in simulated and 
actual tax are quite similar. 
Hansson and Norrman (1986) have shown that progression related more to 
age and to working time than to ability, defined as potential income from a 
fixed input of  time. This is illustrated by  table 3.10. Column  1 repeats the 
average tax rates, by deciles, from table 3.7 above; it suggests substantial prog- 
ressivity. Column 2 shows the distribution of taxes for households containing 
at least one individual between forty-five and fifty-five years of age. A major 
part of the estimated progression disappears, except in the top decile, if age is 
kept constant. 
Column 3 shows the result when differences in working time are also elimi- 
nated. The average weekly working time is calculated for each sex (forty-one 
hours for men, thirty-one for women). The ratio of this number to the actual 134  Erik Norrman and Charles E. McLure Jr. 
Table 3.9  Changes in Individual Income Taxation on Labor Income 
(1991 prices) (change in tax [SKr billion]) 





























-48.4  -33.3 
-36.8  -  15.8 
-  14.2  -  17.3 
-8.1  -3.5 
-  13.6  -8.8 
-9.5  -6.3 
-20.5  -7.1 
-  19.2  -6.0 
Source: Malmer, Persson, and Tengblad (1994). 
working time of  each individual in the forty-five- to  fifty-five-year-old age 
group is then multiplied by  his or her actual income to calculate “potential 
income” for a standard work week. In this way, a new income distribution was 
constructed in which individuals are classified according to potential income.I9 
Since taxes are kept constant, they represent a larger fraction of  potential in- 
come than of  actual income for those who work more than average and a 
smaller fraction for those who work less than average. The result of this adjust- 
ment is interesting, indeed, since all progression vanishes. 
These observations are sustained by Bjorklund (1992), who calculates Gini 
coefficients for two groups of  individuals before and after taxes, both on a 
single-year basis and over seventeen years (which is a proxy for lifetime in- 
come). The relative reduction of inequality induced by the tax system-about 
20 percent in both cases-is  close to the result of  column  1 in table 3.10. 
Bjorklund’s results are reported in table 3.11. 
The interpretation of  these results is that, up to  1990, the tax  system did 
not redistribute income between individuals with different potential income or 
ability but leveled the lifetime income for each household. It may  be ques- 
tioned whether this should be a principal objective for taxation since individu- 
als can use capital markets for this purpose. Genuine redistribution was primar- 
ily related to differences in working time, which may also be criticized. People 
who work more hours in the labor market pay  a higher share of  income in 
19. Thus, the income of a woman who works forty hours per week would be multiplied by  a 
factor 0.78. The woman would be classified as belonging to a lower-income decile when all indi- 
viduals were classified according to their potential income. She would keep a high tax share, while 
others working less than average time would be pushed upward in the distributions with a low 
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Fig. 3.7  METR on corporate income-type  of finance 
Source: See table 3.12. 
taxes. If  taxes are related to potential income, the effect of taxation on the 
income distribution is negligible or even negative. 
Slemrod (1992) contains some results for the United States. He also investi- 
gates the income distribution among individuals and calculates the Gini coef- 
ficients before taxes as .468 (1972) and .567 (1988). The corresponding num- 
bers after taxes are .445 and S44.  These figures indicate a more uneven before- 
tax distribution of  income than in Sweden and a smaller relative reduction in 
inequality by the tax system, 4 percent (1972) and 5 percent (1988). Table 3.10  Taxes as a Percentage of Income in Different Deciles 
Basis for Comparison 
Gross Income per 
Gross Income per  Consumer Units  Consumer Units 
Decile  Consumer Units  45-55  Years Old  45-55  Years Old 
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Source: Hansson and Norman (1986). 
"This concept measures how much the tax system decreases the Gini coefficients after taxes com- 
pared to before taxes. 
Table 3.11  Gini Coefficients, 197690  (individuals 18-30  and 31-43 years of age 
at the beginning of the period) 
18-30  Years of Age  3 1-43  Years of Age 
Before  After  Percentage  Before  After  Percentage 
Year  Taxes  Taxes  Reduction  Taxes  Taxes  Reduction 
~~ 
1975  .353  ,302  14.4  ,378  ,319  15.6 
1980  .280  ,239  14.6  ,293  .233  20.5 
1985  .276  ,223  19.2  ,280  ,217  22.5 
1990  ,276  ,219  20.7  .279  ,221  20.8 
1974-90"  .230  ,189  17.8  ,269  .215  20.1 
Source: Bjorklund (1992). 
"Discount rate 3 percent (the result is robust to change in the rate) 137  Tax Policy in Sweden 
3.3.2  Evasion and Attitudes toward the Tax System 
Reports about the failure of  the tax system have been accompanied by  a 
decreasing faith in the capability of the system. Hence, Myrdal (1978) wrote: 
“The different deductions that can be made from the income tax base make 
progressivity illusive and  turn  us all into a nation  of  cheaters.”20 Hansson 
(1980) reports a public survey concerning the black market for labor. Nineteen 
percent of  the respondents admit paying for services illegally. The amount 
evaded would correspond to only 0.5 percent of national income in 1979. How- 
ever, Hansson estimates the loss of tax revenues due to evasion to be in the 
interval of 4-8  percent of national income. His opinion is supported by Teng- 
blad (1994), who estimates the loss at 5 percent of GDP. 
The National Tax Board (Riksskatteverket 1993) reports that the attitude of 
taxpayers toward the tax system has changed substantially during the period 
1986-92.  Prior to the tax reform of  1991, 65 percent disliked the system, an- 
other 24 percent did not have any preference, and only 9 percent thought that 
it was  fairly or pretty good. After the reform, the number who disliked the 
system fell to 36 percent, the indifferent group increased to 37 percent, and 
over 25 percent said that they liked it. A noteworthy fact is the concern among 
Swedish households for tax matters after tax reform; 44 percent reported a 
substantial interest in these issues and 38 percent a moderate interest in 1992. 
3.4  Tax Wedges and Effects on Resource Allocation 
3.4.1  Marginal Effective Tax Rates on Capital Income 
In  1980, the corporate income tax was extremely nonneutral in its effect 
on various types of  investment and sources of  finance. Because of  the extra 
investment allowances (provided at a rate of 20 percent for machinery and 10 
percent for buildings) and the investment funds system, equipment benefited 
from a marginal effective tax rate (METR) of  roughly  -47  percent (i.e., a 
subsidy of 47 percent).21  By comparison, investment in buildings was taxed at 
a rate of  12 percent, and the METR on investment in inventories was about 25 
percent, despite the ability to deduct 60 percent of the purchase price of inven- 
tories (Norrman 1995b).22  (These numbers are reported in table 3.12 and illus- 
20. “De olika inkomstavdragen m m gor progressiviteten illusorisk och forvandlar oss till ett 
folk av fifflare.” 
21. All the calculations reported are based on an assumed inflation rate of  4  percent, unless 
otherwise noted. In some cases (e.g., investment in buildings and debt financing), the results are 
quite sensitive to the rate of inflation. 
22. The calculations are based on the “fixed r case.” Differences between these numbers and 
numbers presented in Sodersten (1991) may be explained by the fact that Sodersten’s study is based 
on the “fixed p  case.” Also, Norrman explicitly considers a risk premium to equity capital. The 
fixed r case keeps the return after corporate taxes constant (illustrating a case with a fixed world 
market rate of return), implying for any given saver that all projects yield the same net return but 138  Erik Norrman and Charles E. McLure Jr. 
Table 3.12  Marginal Effective Corporate Tax Rates on Corporate Income 
(real interest rate = 3 percent; inflation = 4 percent; risk premia: 
on loans = 2 percent; on shares = 7 percent) 
1980  1985  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Average METR  2.0  17.0  18.1  3.6  3.6  3.6 
Type of finance: 
Debt  (-176)  -73.4  -79.5  -41.5  -41.5  -41.5 
Retained profits  28.1  35.9  37.4  18.5  18.5  18.5 
New share issues  9.4  20.3  21.6  2.5  2.5  2.5 
Type of investment: 
Equipment  -47.4  10.1  11.0  3.8  3.8  3.8 
Buildings  11.8  18.2  19.2  2.9  2.9  2.9 
Inventories  25.4  25.5  27.2  5.9  5.9  5.9 
1994  1995 
11.6  4.9 
-36.8  -54.9 
25.9  21.4 
26.2  21.8 
4.7  5.4 
12.0  -2.0 
22.7  24.2 
Source; Norrman (1995b). 
trated in figs. 3.7 and 3.8. Note that they refer only to the effects of the corpo- 
rate income tax; effects of the taxation of investors are discussed below.) 
Whereas,  in  the  aggregate,  the corporate METR  on investment  financed 
from retained earnings was about 28 percent, investment financed from new 
share issues was taxed at an effective rate of 9 percent because of the partial 
deduction of the part of dividends attributable to new issues. Debt-financed 
investment received a subsidy above 100  The individual income tax 
more than offset the corporate-level  subsidy to debt-financed investment and 
increased the taxation of new share issues and retained earnings. The uneven- 
ness of  tax policy produced the appearance, and perhaps the effect, of hori- 
zontal inequity.24  It also stimulated heavy debt financing compared to other 
countries; debt financing contributed 40 percent of total finance in Sweden, 
compared to 20 percent in the United States and Great Britain in 1980 (King 
and Fullerton  1984, table A4). 
The 1985 reforms increased the average corporate METR from 2 to 17 per- 
cent.25  Reflecting  the elimination of the subsidy to investment in machinery 
represented by the extra investment allowance, the corporate METR rose from 
that the return will differ between different categories of  savers. It also means that the pretax 
returns will differ between projects according to the tax treatment of different types of investments. 
The fixed p  case, on the other hand, fixes the return before corporate taxes (assuming arbitrage 
possibilities between firms concerning investment projects). 
23. The high negative tax rate on debt finance depends on the fact that, when the tax rate is 
calculated, the required rate of return is the denominator. In the case of debt finance, this value is 
close to zero. 
24. Horizontal equity is a question of equal treatment of taxpayers in similar circumstances. To 
the extent that capital is reallocated to equalize after-tax returns, uneven taxation does not actually 
create horizontal inequities. 
25. The difference in  inflation rates in the two years-I0  percent in 1980 and 5  percent in 
1985-complicates  comparison of METRs. Assuming a constant inflation rate makes it possible 
to isolate the effects of changes in tax policy, but it is not clear which year’s inflation rate to use 
























*  Inventories  +  Machineries -  Buildings 
Fig. 3.8  METR on corporate income-type  of investment 
Source: See table 3.12. 
-47  percent in 1980 to +10 percent in 1985. The changes in the METRs on 
income from investment in buildings and inventories were more modest; the 
former increased from 12 to 18 percent, and the latter remained unchanged, at 
25 percent. 
While the  1985 reforms reduced the spread of METRs for investments in 
various types of assets, the results for different sources of finance and suppliers 























1980  1985  1990 
Year 
1995 
New share issues  -0- Debt  --O- Retained profits 
Fig. 3.9  METR on corporate income, including taxes on investors-type 
of finance 
Source: See table 3.13. 
tially undertaxed and investments financed from new  share issues substan- 
tially overtaxed. 
The 1991 reforms were more far-reaching. The statutory corporate tax rate 
was reduced from 52 to 30 percent, the investment funds system was  slated 
for elimination, and the deduction for 50 percent of  inventory purchases was 
eliminated. To provide relief for overtaxation of income from new issues (and 141  Tax Policy in Sweden 
a degree of loss offset), a new “tax equalization reserve” was created; in effect, 
firms could deduct from taxable income up to 30 percent of net increases in 
equity. This had the effect of reducing the corporate tax rate to 23 percent. 
Individuals were (and still are) subject to a flat-rate tax of 30 percent on inter- 
est, dividends, and capital gains. 
As can be seen in table 3.12, the 199  1 reform reduced the overall corporate 
METR, compared to  1985, from  17 to 3.6 percent.  Corporate tax policy is 
markedly more neutral toward investment decisions. Also, financial decisions 
are less distorted by  the tax system, although discrimination against equity 
finance still exists. Similarly, the tax treatment of various assets remains some- 
what uneven. One of  the main reasons for nonneutralities is the absence of 
inflation adjustment of  the tax base. As long as the tax system is based on 
nominal principles, perfect neutrality is not likely to be achieved.26 
During  1991-93,  no changes occurred in the corporate tax system, but, in 
1994, the corporate tax rate was lowered to 28 percent, and the tax equalization 
reserve was replaced by a new profit-based system. These changes are reflected 
in an increase in the average METR at the corporate level from 3.6 to 11.6 
percent. Abolishing the tax equalization reserve has several other effects. Since 
equity capital no longer constituted the base for tax credits, the effective tax 
rate on new equity capital increased. At the same time, investments in build- 
ings  and inventories were  disfavored by this  change and  the dispersion in 
METRs with respect to corporate taxation increased.27  Another change work- 
ing to increase the dispersion of rates was that in the double taxation of equity 
capital. This is treated in the next section. 
3.4.2  Marginal Effective Tax Rates and Ownership 
As noted earlier, the 1994 reform was intended to move the mitigation of 
economic double taxation of corporate profits from the corporate level to the 
household level. This change was effectuated by abolishing the Anne11 deduc- 
tion and reducing the tax rate on dividends to zero and the rate on capital gains 
to 12.5 percent. The main reason for this change was harmonization with the 
tax systems of the EC countries. 
Table 3.13 and figure 3.9 compare the METRs for different investors and 
different forms of  finance between  1980 and  1995. Unlike the figures dis- 
cussed earlier in this section, these calculations consider taxes at both the cor- 
porate and the investor levels. 
Two major observations should be stressed; the first regards the disfavoring 
26. This is due to the fact that inflation increases taxation of  low risk assets more than that of 
high-risk assets, at least if the risk premium is not perfectly correlated to inflation (see Nomnan 
1995b). 
27. This occurs because the possibility to get untaxed reserves by  using the tax equalization 
reserve decreased as the investment depreciated. Since machinery depreciates more rapidly than 
buildings and inventories do not depreciate at all, investments in inventories were favored within 
the old system compared to machinery and buildings in this respect. 142  Erik Norrman and Charles E. McLure Jr. 
Table 3.13  Aggregate Marginal Effective Tax Rates on Corporate Income 
(real interest rate = 3 percent; inflation = 4 percent: risk premia: 
on loans = 2 percent; on shares = 7 percent) 
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49.1  46.2  46.2 
-41.5  -41.5  -41.5 
-16.0  -16.0  -16.0 
34.9  22.2  22.2 
41.4  38.0  37.8 
18.5  18.5  18.5 
24.3  24.3  24.3 
39.0  34.8  34.8 
45.7  45.4  45.2 
22.8  22.8  22.8 
16.2  16.2  16.2 
43.5  36.6  36.6 
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Source: Norrman (1995b). 
of  direct finance by domestic households, which may be a basic explanation 
for the situation depicted in figure 3.1 above. The second is the effect of the 
199  1-94  reforms mitigating this phenomenon. 
In  1985, foreign investors were given a net  subsidy of  73 percent,  while 
domestic households, on average, were paying an 88 percent tax in the case of 
debt finance.28  The major causes behind the latter number are the overstatement 
of taxable profits resulting from inflation and the wealth tax. As a result of the 
reform of capital income taxation in 1991, debt finance by households became 
more favorable than before, but the first best choice for households was still to 
buy shares in companies that retained profits, although the difference between 
debt financing and equity financing became a lot smaller. 
An interesting fact is the reversed tax situation between domestic house- 
holds and other investors in 1994. Before  1994, households were disfavored 
by the tax system as owners of Swedish shares (although the extremely high 
tax rates on debt finance still made ownership the best choice for the average 
household that wanted to invest in corporations). In 1994, the elimination of 
dividend taxation had a substantial effect on the incentives to own Swedish 
firms compared to earlier years. 
These numbers must, however, be interpreted with great care since the tax 
situation of foreigners in their home countries is not considered. Another rea- 
son for circumspection is the use of average tax rates. There is strong evidence 
28. The tax wedge abroad at the investor level is not considered in the calculations, but the 
Swedish coupon tax on dividends is. 143  Tax Policy in Sweden 
for the existence of  clientele effects, that is, comparative advantages in  the 
different forms of finance (Age11 and Edin 1988). If these are important, the 
use of average tax rates may be highly misleading. For example, corporate debt 
may, in practice, be held by pension funds and households with low marginal 
tax rates on current capital income (eventually zero), while high-income earn- 
ers keep corporate shares in order to generate low-taxed capital gains. Such 
behavior would be consistent with both the incentives disclosed in table 3.13 
and our discussion of empirical evidence in section 3.3 above. 
It is also noteworthy that different investors may have had different views 
on the distribution of corporate profits. With the exception of 1994, the average 
household would prefer retained profits to dividends. At the same time, pen- 
sion funds should have been  more concerned  about  dividends than  capital 
gains. Foreign investors and life insurance funds were probably more or less 
indifferent to dividends before 1994 but would now prefer capital gains rather 
than dividends. 
As mentioned, the numbers in table 3.13 are based on averages. In practice, 
no one actually makes decisions based on average tax rates. This brings about 
the question of the dispersion in tax rates. The rational behavior of investors is 
to seek the cheapest way to finance a specific project. In order to illustrate the 
issue, the variation in the METRs related to table 3.13 is given in table 3.14. 
It is clear that the difference in taxation of different investors and invest- 
ments historically has been very large. At the same time, it is obvious that the 
dispersion  is decreasing, implying  fewer tax-induced  distortions  in the re- 
source allocation after the 1991-94  reforms. 
3.4.3  Extending the Portfolio Choice 
The analysis above concentrated on financial decisions related to corporate 
investment. In this section, we focus on household taxation and take a broader 
view of portfolio choice by comparing additional savings possibilities. There- 
fore, the investigation is extended to include investments in owner-occupied 
housing and government bonds. 
The approach is to calculate the METRs given that the real rate of return to 
a risk-free  security is 3 percent before taxes. This may be conceived as an 
assumption of an exogenous world market real rate of interest to Sweden. For 
owner-occupied housing, the opportunity return is assumed to be an investment 
in a corporate bond. A risk premium of  2 percent is therefore added to the 
nominal return to government bonds. Pension funds and life insurance funds 
are assumed to invest primarily in noncorporate bonds. Like those reported 
earlier, these calculations are made assuming an inflation rate of  4 percent. 
Although the METRs of  1985-91  were higher owing to higher inflation rates, 
this approach is used in order to isolate the importance of the tax rules from 
the influence of inflation. 
Table 3.15 gives the results of these calculations for 1985-95 for an individ- 
ual with a medium level of income. As before, inflation causes the income Table 3.14  Percentage Variation in Aggregate Marginal Effective Tax Rates on Corporate Income (real interest rate = 3 percent; inflation = 4 
percent; risk premia: on loans = 2 percent; on shares = 7 percent) 
1985  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max 
Corporate level: 
Qpe  of  finance: 
Debt  -79  -47  -86  -48  -51  -11  -51  -11  -51  -11  -45  -10  -75  -11 
Retained profits  30  42  5  7  14  20  14  20  14  20  20  33  17  35 
New share issues  13  27  2  4  -5  5  -5  5  -5  5  21  33  1  24 
Type of investment: 
Machinery  -  79  30  -2  5  -51  20  -51  20  -51  20  -45  21  -51  21 
Buildings  -78  38  -2  6  -46  19  -46  19  -46  19  -41  27  -75  1 
Inventories  -  47  42  -2  8  -11  14  -11  14  -11  14  -10  33  -11  35 
Households  55  90  55  87  40  60  37  58  37  58  24  58  34  58 
Foreign investor  -  79  42  -86  44  -51  26  -51  26  -51  26  -45  46  -75  38 
Pension fund  -  79  42  -86  48  -24  26  -24  26  -24  26  -27  37  -28  43 
Life insurance fund  -  19  48  -5  69  6  61  -17  39  -17  39  -5  40  10  60 
Investor: 
Source: Noman (1995b) 145  Tax Policy in Sweden 
Table 3.15  Marginal Effective Tax Rates on Different Types of Capital Income 
for Medium Income Earner (real interest rate = 3 percent; 
inflation = 4 percent; risk premia: on corporate bonds and owner- 
occupied housing on shares = 7 percent) 









Life insurance claims 
Capital gains on corporate 
shares (10 years) 
Owner occupied housing: 
15 years ownership, 100 
percent equity financed 
82.3  82.3 
88.2  84.2 
126.0  122.7 
.o  .o 
-90.0  -72.0  - 
.o  .o 
24.5  24.5 
57.9  58.5 
128.9  42.3 
45.7  45.4  45.2  29.2  56.2 
49.0  46.2  46.2  48.0  41.1 
86.7  85.0  83.3  83.3  83.3 
.o  .o  .o  .O  .O 
-54.0  -54.0  -54.0  -54.0  -54.0 
21.9  21.9  21.9  21.9  35.0 
53.7  44.8  44.8  46.7  63.0 
41.4  38.0  37.8  36.6  43.3 
43.2  42.1  41.0  35.7  35.1 
Source: Norman (1995~). 
"ate  of interest 9 percent. 
from assets fixed in nominal terms to be overstated. Actually, the influence of 
inflation more than doubles the value of the METRs compared to the statutory 
tax rates in most cases if we use actual inflation rates (see Norrman 199%). It 
should also be noted that, while totally equity-financed owner-occupied hous- 
ing faced a positive tax rate, the possibility of mortgage financing as well as 
the presence of  subsidies to newly constructed homes often imply a negative 
tax rate on home ownership. 
Developments from 1985 to 1995 are extraordinary. If we ignore consumer 
durables, the range of METRs has shrunk dramatically, from 0-129  percent to 
35-83  percent. Even though the numbers reported in the table must be interpre- 
ted with care-the  variation in tax position between individuals was consider- 
ably greater before 199 1 than after, when it comes to capital income taxation- 
a firm conclusion must be that the new capital income taxation in  1991 in- 
creased neutrality substantially but also that the changes in 1995 will work in 
the opposite direction. 
In this section, we have pointed out the wide dispersion in the METRs dur- 
ing the last decade. This fact has of course been revealed from time to time by 
different investigations, and it is obvious that these observations have exerted 
a major influence on the development of the tax system. A fundamental ques- 
tion is to what extent other pressures have been in force when the reforms of 
the 1980s and 1990s have been enacted. One of these is international pressure 
on  tax  coordination  operating  because  of  the  openness  of  the  Swedish 
economy. 146  Erik Norrman and Charles E. McLure Jr. 
3.5  International Pressures behind the Reforms 
3.5.1  Worldwide Tax Reforms 
During the 1980s, a wave of tax reform swept the  Although details 
differ, sometimes substantially, from country to country, it is reasonable to say 
that key common features predominate. In particular,  in many countries tax 
reform combined reductions in statutory tax rates with base broadening, in- 
cluding especially the curtailment of investment incentives. Tax reform in Swe- 
den  fits squarely  within  this  worldwide movement  toward imposition of  in- 
come taxes characterized by broader bases and lower rates. 
There may be a tendency, especially in the United States, to think that the 
U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 stimulated tax reform elsewhere and that, with- 
out the 1986 act, the decade of tax reform would not have occurred. While this 
view has some legitimacy, it is easily overstated. It is doubtless true that the 
breathtaking American tax reform captured the attention of the world tax pol- 
icy community, gave tax reform increased legitimacy, and perhaps acted as a 
catalyst for action in many countries. But this is hardly enough to explain world 
tax reform; after all, the world does not follow all the policy initiatives of the 
United States, even the bold ones.3o  It is also true that some countries reacted 
defensively to tax reform in the United States, especially the deep reductions 
in tax rates3' Again, this may have been an important contributing factor, but 
it is probably not  enough, by itself, to explain the phenomenon  at hand in 
Sweden. 
There are  other  potential  explanations  for  the  unusual  phenomenon  of 
worldwide tax reform: common intellectual underpinnings and domestic rec- 
ognition of the need for tax reform, based on analysis of local conditions. This 
explanation seems especially important in the case of  Sweden. After all, the 
Swedish debate on tax reform predated the U.S. Tax  Reform Act of 1986 and 
even the proposals for tax reform that the U.S. Treasury Department submitted 
to President Ronald Reagan in late 1984. Underlying the public debate in Swe- 
den was economic analysis of  the effects of  the taxation  of capital that was 
every bit as sophisticated as any being done anywhere in the world. Particularly 
noteworthy  is the fact that Sweden was one of  the countries included in the 
29. On this, see Pechman (1988), Tanzi (1987), OECD (1990), Whalley (1990), and the papers 
in Boskin and McLure (1990). 
30. Moreover, it is important to note that the prior tax reform in the United Kingdom played an 
important role in convincing American policymakers that the combination of rate reduction and 
elimination of  investment incentives was not unreasonable. See McLure (1992, 102) and, for a 
discussion that is less generous to Nigel Lawson, chancellor of the Exchequer of the United King- 
dom, Dilnot and Kay (1990, 154-55). 
31. Canada, with its close economic ties to the United States, is the best example of  this. The 
Canadian tax reform debate, which had been stalled, assumed new urgency when the United States 
slashed its corporate income tax rates. There was real and justified fear that American tirms would 
organize their affairs to place debt in Canada (to benefit from deductions against high rates) and 
income in the United States (where it would be taxed at low rates). See Whalley (1990). 147  Tax Policy in Sweden 
influential and pathbreaking NBER study of  marginal effective tax rates that 
helped identify and quantify the distortions caused by uneven taxation (King 
and Fullerton 1984). 
Thus, Sodersten (1991, 4)  seems correct when he writes, “The U.S. Tax 
Reform Act of  1986 and its international followers are the obvious sources of 
inspiration for this reform, but it also has its roots in the . .  . reorientation of 
Swedish tax policy debate that started already in the beginning of the 1980’s.” 
Whalley (1990) reaches a similar conclusion. He writes, “These reforms . . . 
have taken place over a long period of time and clearly predate recent U.S. 
changes. Reform can be dated to  1981, to the  so-called ‘wonderful night’ 
agreement between the Centre Party, the Liberals and the Social Democrats.” 
He goes on to note, “The striking feature of these reforms is both the length of 
the period over which change was underway, and the sweeping nature of the 
changes now planned for 1991. Much of the reform seems largely independent 
of U.S. changes” (p. 299). 
3.5.2  Response to International Pressures 
There is little doubt that Sweden was  responding in part to international 
pressures (not just “following the crowd” or responding to common intellec- 
tual developments) when it reformed its tax system. These pressures took sev- 
eral forms. 
Tax Rates 
If reductions of tax rates in other countries were not matched, Sweden would 
have been left vulnerable in several respects. First, Sweden would have had 
difficulty competing with low-rate countries for investment from countries that 
exempt foreign-source income. Moreover, after the U.S. Tax  Reform Act of 
1986, many U.S. firms would have viewed the high Swedish rates much like a 
firm from a country that exempts foreign-source income. This is true because 
the 1986 act placed many more American firms in an excess credit position; 
such firms actually pay foreign taxes, instead of automatically crediting them 
against their U.S.  tax liability. 
Second, firms operating in both Sweden and low-rate countries would have 
the incentive and the opportunity to manipulate financial and accounting prac- 
tices to minimize taxes. They could be expected to borrow in Sweden to take 
advantage of  its higher-value deductions for interest. They might also manipu- 
late transfer prices to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions. Such adjustments 
could cost the Swedish Fisc large amounts of revenue. 
Mitigation of  Corporate Double Taxation 
Despite having long had the Anne11 deduction for dividends paid on new 
issues of stock, Sweden was noticeably out of step, especially in Europe, in its 
treatment of  dividends; it had no generally applicable system of  relief  for 
double taxation of  dividends. Rather than adopting the imputation system, 148  Erik Norrman and Charles E. McLure Jr. 
which is standard throughout Europe, or the split-rate system (which is also 
used in Germany), Sweden chose the rather unusual technique of exempting 
dividends from taxation at the shareholder 
This choice has several clear advantages. It is simpler than the imputation 
method, which requires the shareholder to include grossed-up dividends in tax- 
able income and then take credit for corporate tax deemed to be withheld 
against tax on those dividends. The imputation method is commonly chosen 
over exemption for two reasons: it takes account of  the graduated individual 
income tax on shareholders, and its benefits can easily be withheld from for- 
eigners.  (Indeed, it is rather complicated to extend the imputation credit to 
foreigners; since they have no tax liability in the country where dividends are 
paid, it is necessary to make refunds to them.) But the first of these advantages 
does not exist if, as in Sweden, dividends are taxed at a flat rate. The second 
feature, discrimination against foreign investors, can be interpreted as a disad- 
vantage, rather than an advantage, whether one takes a unilateral (Swedish) or 
multilateral view of the matter. 
EC and Ruding: The Wild Cards 
Potential membership in the European Community (EC) added another di- 
mension to the question of foreign influence on Swedish tax policy. In Febru- 
ary 1992, a committee of independent experts headed by Onno Ruding of the 
Netherlands submitted a report on company taxation to the Commission of the 
EC (Commission of the European Communities 1992 [hereafter referred to as 
the Ruding Report]). The Ruding committee dealt with several issues that are 
of relevance to the current discussion. While its recommendations, if adopted, 
would not pose serious impediments to Swedish membership in the EC, the 
Ruding Report will almost certainly be considered in any future Swedish de- 
bates on corporate tax policy. 
To prevent what it calls destructive tax competition, the Ruding Report pro- 
posed a minimum corporate tax rate of  30 percent. The Swedish rate of  28 
percent adopted in 1994 falls below the proposed floor. 
The Ruding Committee did not make any recommendations on the proper 
relation between corporate and individual income taxes, leaving this matter for 
later resolution. It is thus difficult to know how Sweden’s newly adopted policy 
of exempting dividends would fare if judged by EC standards. 
In one of its less satisfactory conclusions, the Ruding Report condoned the 
use of investment incentives to encourage investment, provided that they are 
“nondiscriminatory”;  unfortunately, it failed to define nondiscrimination  in 
this context. It favored investment credits over rate reductions and incentives 
built into the measurement of taxable income because they are more cost effec- 
tive than the former and more transparent than the latter. The committee pro- 
32. It might be noted that, in its  1986 reform, Colombia adopted this approach because of 
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posed safeguards on the use of incentives: authorization of the Commission of 
the EC, no incentives for financial activities, and “sunset” provisions. Enact- 
ment  of  these  recommendations  presumably  would  not  have  precluded 
the elimination of investment incentives, but it might preclude their reinstate- 
ment. 
3.6  Evaluation 
There can be no doubt that the Swedish income tax is vastly better now than 
it was in 1980. Statutory rates are much lower, and marginal effective tax rates 
fall in a much narrower range. As shown in figures 3.10 and 3.11, the overall 
tax burden is still among the highest in the world and is still basically financed 
by taxes on labor. The new system is simpler, more neutral, and more equitable 
horizontally. And, given the extent to which the previous system provided both 
opportunities and incentives for evasion, it is probably not much less progres- 
sive when burdens are compared to incomes across income groups.33 
Before the reforms, revenues from heavy taxes on labor income, including 
mandated contributions to social insurance programs, were being used to fill 
the gap left by relatively light taxation of income from capital. As other papers 
demonstrate, the heavy taxation of labor income has had enormous cost. 
The undertaxation  of income from capital occurred, despite high marginal 
tax rates, because of extremely generous treatment of certain types of invest- 
ment. The tax treatment of capital was extremely distortionary, as shown by 
the range of METRs applicable to various types of assets and to various means 
of financing. Moreover, the ability of some taxpayers to convert labor income 
to capital income or to offset it with deductions for interest expense under- 
mined the revenue potential and fairness of labor taxation. What little prog- 
ressivity there appeared to be was largely a matter of redistribution across age 
groups; within particular age cohorts, there was very little progressivity. 
The reforms eliminated many of the anomalous features of the Swedish sys- 
tem, lowered  statutory rates, and brought marginal effective tax rates closer 
together. In addition to reducing disincentives for market labor, these reforms 
should lead to a more rational allocation of the nation’s capital. The fairness of 
the system, as well as the appearance of fairness, should improve markedly. 
Although the two systems reached their 1985 status by somewhat different 
routes, the post-1985 reforms of the Swedish and US.  systems bear some simi- 
larities. In both cases, deviations from the income tax model had created com- 
plexity, distortions, inequities, and disrespect for the law. In both  cases, the 
33. In comparing the present market-oriented tax system with its predecessor, which was based 
on social engineering and fine-tuning of the economy, one is reminded of the revolution in astron- 
omy that resulted when the elegantly simple sun-centered Copernican system replaced the com- 
plex earth-centered Ptolemaic system of epicycles. That is high praise-and  extreme criticism. 
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Fig. 3.10  Total tax revenue as percentage of GDP, 1992 
Source: Revenue statistics of OECD member countries. 
advantages of debt finance, especially in a time of relatively high inflation, had 
not gone unnoticed. Tax shelters of  various types, including owner-occupied 
housing as well as business deals of  questionable economic merit, were un- 
dermining the integrity of the system and the productivity of both economies. 
In both cases, bold initiatives involving a return to the principles underlying 
the income tax model substantially reduced the problems identified. 151  Tax Policy in Sweden 
Fig. 3.11 
Source: Revenue statistics of  OECD member countries. 
Revenues from different taxes as percentage of total taxation 
However, even though the Swedish tax system has become more equitable 
and more neutral, taxes in Sweden remain among the highest in the Western 
world and therefore continue to affect almost every economic decision that 
households and firms make. This final problem can be addressed successfully 
only by  reducing  the overall level of  taxation  and thus the level of  public 
spending. 152  Erik Norman and Charles E. McLure Jr. 
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